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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Does the statutory duty of serving "process and notice" during 
the course and scope of empoloyment of a sheriff constitute a 
"governmental function"? 
Are the notice requirments of the Governmental Immunity Act 
mandatory where immunity has been waived for the negligent 
operation of a motor vehicle? 
Are the previous decisions of this court upholding the 
constitutionality of the Governmental Immunity Act, Section 
63-30-1, et seq., valid and controlling? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Section 63-30-1, et seq., Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff. Le Ann Schultz, instituted this action in the 
District Court for personal injuries sustained in a vehicular 
accident with defendant Conger. At the time of the accident 
Conger was a deputy Salt Lake County Sheriff who was engaged in 
the scope and course of his employment and was serving "process 
and notice." The Third Judicial District Court, by and through 
Judge Leonard Russon, granted defendant Conger's motion to 
dismiss on the ground that plaintiff-Schultz had failed to file 
a notice of claim with Salt Lake County as required by Sections 
63-30-11 and 14 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Plaintiff-Schultz appeals. (The relevant provisions of the 
Governmental Immunity Act are attached as Addendum A). (The 
Order of the District Court is attached as Addendum B). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this case demonstrate the following: 
1. On March 9, 1984 respondent Weldon Conger was employed 
as a deputy sheriff with the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Office. (R-2. 9. 13). 
2. While serving in the course and scope of his 
employment and driving a vehicle, owned by and registered to 
Salt Lake County, he was involved in a two car accident with 
the plaintiff, Le Ann Schultz. (R-2, 9, 13). 
3. Approximately six weeks later Schultz's insurance 
carrier filed a proof of claim under Section 31-41-6, Utah Code 
Annotated, the automobile no-fault law then in effect, for 
possible reimbursement of Personal Injury Protection benefits 
the carrier had paid to Schultz. (R-34). 
4. No claim was ever filed by Schultz with the Salt Lake 
County Commission under the provisions of Sections 63-30-11 and 
14 for injuries sustained by Schultz in the accident. (R-8, 
67; Schultz Brief p. 5). 
5. Over nineteen months after the cause of action arose 
Schultz filed suit for personal injuries arising out of the 
accident in the Third Judicial District Court. (R-2, 11). 
6. The action filed by Schultz was dimissed on motion for 
failure to file a notice of claim with Salt Lake County as 
required by the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity 
Act. (R-65-69). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Governmental immunity has been waived for the negligent 
operation of a motor vehicle driven by an employee in the 
course and scope of his employment.— Immunity having been 
waived, plaintiff-Schultz was . therefore required to file a 
notice of claim under the provisions of Sections 63-30-11 and 
14 of the Immunity Act, not because driving an automobile is a 
governmental function but because service of process and notice 
is. 
Having failed to file the statutorily required notice of 
claim, the District Court properly dismissed plaintiff-
Schultz's complaint. The notice of claim filed by plaintiff's 
1/ Section 63-30-7, Utah Code Annotated. 
insurance carrier for Personal Injury Protection under the 
no-fault statute did not constitute notice under the Immunity 
Act; the carrier's notice was for a different claim, and did 
not meet the statutorily required elements for a notice of 
claim. 
Plaintiff's own failure to take any steps to ascertain that 
the Governmental Immunity Act applied in this case, especially 
when she knew a county-owned vehicle was involved, does not 
excuse plaintiff-Schultz from complying with the mandatory 
notice requirements of the Immunity Act. 
The constitutionality of the Governmental Immunity Act has 
previously been upheld by the court against challenges on the 
grounds of protection and due process; the constitutionality of 
the Act should again be sustained. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY HAS BEEN WAIVED FOR 
INJURY RESULTING FROM THE NEGLIGENT 
OPERATION OF A MOTOR VEHICLE. 
Deputy Sheriff Conger makes no claim of immunity from suit 
under the Governmental Immunity Act for injuries allegedly 
caused by his negligent operation of a county-owned vehicle. 
The plaintiff-Schultz strenuously argues in her brief that 
driving a motor vehicle is not conduct which is uniquely 
governmental and,o therefore. Deputy Conder should not be immune 
from suit. Conger does not disagree. 
Deputy Conger is well aware, as Schultz apparently is not, 
that immunity from suit has been waived under the Governmental 
Immunity Act for injury sustained from the negligent operation 
of a motor vehicle. Section 63-30-7 provides in relevant part: 
"[ I Immunity from suit from all govern-
mental entities is waived for injury result-
ing from the negligent operation of any 
employee of a motor vehicle or other equip-
ment during the performance of his duties, 
within the scope of employment, or under 
color of authority...." 
Schultz has not named Salt Lake County as a defendant, but 
has named Deputy Conger as a defendant in her claim for damages 
under Section 63-30-4(3) of the Act which provides in relevant 
part: 
"(3) The remedy against a governmental 
entity or its employee for an injury caused 
by an act or omission which occurs during the 
performance of such employee's duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority is...exclusive of any other civil 
action or proceeding by reason of the same 
subject matter against the employee...unless 
the employee acted or failed to act through 
fraud or malice." 
Schultz's argument that driving a vehicle is not a uniquely 
governmental activity ignores the statutory waiver of immunity 
in an attempt to cloud the fact that she failed to file a 
notice of claim as required by Sections 63-30-11 and 14 of the 
Immunity Act. 
POINT II 
THE SERVICE OF SUBPOENAS DURING THE SCOPE AND 
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT BY A DEPUTY COUNTY 
SHERIFF CONSTITUTES A "GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION." 
In the lower court, Schultz never raised the issue of 
whether Deputy Conger's conduct of serving subpoenas was a 
governmental function for which he and the County were 
otherwise immune from suit under the provisions of the Immunity 
Act. Rather, her sole argument was, and on appeal continues to 
be, that driving a vehicle is not an activity which is uniquely 
governmental. 
Schultz has also failed to recognize or raise at any point 
in this case the broader and essential issue of whether the 
statutorily imposed duty to serve process and notice "is of 
such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a 
governmental agency or that it is essential to the core of 
2/ governmental activity."— 
Conger submits that the statutory duty to serve process and 
notice meets both elements of the governmental function test 
set forth in Standiford. The sheriff is required by statute to 
serve process and notice. These terms are defined in Section 
17-22-1, U.C.A., as follows: 
"•Process1 as used in this chapter 
includes all writs, warrants, summonses and 
orders of the courts or justice or judicial 
officers. 'Notice1 includes all papers and 
orders, except process, required to be 
served in any proceeding before any court, 
board, commission or officer, or when 
required by law to be served independently 
of such proceedings." 
The general duties of the sheriff are provided in Section 
17-22-2, which provides in relevant part: 
"The sheriff shall: 
& Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 605 P.2d 1230, 
1236-1237 (1980). 
(9) Serve all process and notice in the 
manner prescribed by law...." 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires in 
part that: 
"Every subpoena shall be issued by the 
clerk under the seal of the court, shall 
state the name of the court and the title of 
the action, and shall command each person to 
whom it is directed to attend and give testi-
mony at a time and place therein specified. 
The clerk shall issue a subpoena, or a 
subpoena for the production of documentary 
evidence, signed and sealed but otherwise in 
blank, to a party requesting it, who shall 
fill it in before service." (Emphasis added). 
Rule 4 also provides that failure to obey a subpoena makes a 
person subject to judicial contempt proceedings under this 
rule. It should be noted that in large part it is through 
subpoenas that the judicial branch of government is able to 
function in an orderly, efficient, and authoritative manner. 
The duty of service of summons has been held to be obliga-
3/ tory and subject to the extraordinary writ of mandamus.— In 
Hamilton, the Oregon Court of Appeals interpreted that state's 
statutes, which are similar to Utah's, regarding the sheriff's 
duty to serve summons. In finding that the sheriff's duty to 
serve summonses was mandatory, regardless of the fact that 
private individuals over the years of 18 could also serve 
summons, the court held: 
"We hold that the sheriff has a 
statutory duty to serve a summons in a 
civil action and the duty is enforceable by 
a writ of mandamus." Id. at 344. 
1/ Hamilton v. Hamilton, 676 P.2d 341 (Or. App., 1984) 
The court in Hamilton also found that even though private 
individuals could serve summons that all service of summons was 
governmental in nature and governed by statute. And while the 
courts had power to direct the sheriff to serve summons, orders 
and process, it had no such authority over private individuals. 
That a private individual may also serve some process and 
notice does not alter the fact that these activities relate 
solely to judicial and quasi-judicial functions which are both 
uniquely governmental and essential to the core of governmental 
activity. 
This court has held that it is axiomatic that a sheriff, in 
appointing deputy sheriffs, is acting in connection with his 
official duties. Snyder v. Cook, 688 P.2d 496, 498 (Ut. 
1984). It should also be axiomatic that a sheriff performing 
his statutory duty of serving process and notice in connection 
with the judicial functions of state government is also an 
official duty for which he is immune. 
The court's reasoning in Borthick where it expounded on the 
governmental function test announced in Standiford is germane 
in this case: 
"Standiford's reference to activities 
that 'can only be performed by a govern-
mental agency1 does not preclude govern-
mental immunity for supervisory functions 
in some respects similar to those that 
could be performed by a private association 
authorized by agreements such as self 
regulation by an industry." (Emphasis 
added). Ld. at 631. 
That a private individual may engage in conduct similar to 
that prescribed for sheriffs does not preclude the finding of a 
governmental function in the exercise of statutorily prescribed 
duties by a deputy sheriff. 
Conger submits that he was engaged in the governmental 
function of service of process and notice in the course and 
scope of his employment as a deputy county sheriff at the time 
of the accident. Therefore, both he and the government would 
be totally immune from suit except for the waiver of immunity 
in Section 63-30-7, U.C.A. for negligent operation of a 
vehicle. However, plaintiff failed to file a notice of claim 
with the governmental entity as required by the Immunity Act, 
and Schultz's cause of action is now barred by the statute. 
POINT III 
THE FILING OF A NOTICE OF CLAIM WITH A 
GOVERNMENTAL BODY OF A POLITICAL SUBDIVI-
SION IS A MANDATORY PREREQUISITE OF THE 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT PRIOR TO FILING 
SUIT IN A DISTRICT COURT. 
A. PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO FILE THE MANDATORY NOTICE OF CLAIM 
WITHIN ONE YEAR OF THE TIME IN WHICH THE CAUSE OF ACTION 
AROSE WAS FATAL TO PLAINTIFF'S ACTION. THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DISMISSAL OF HER LAWSUIT SHOULD BE SUSTAINED. 
This court on numerous occasions has consistently held that 
the filing of a claim with the governing body of a governmental 
entity under the Governmental Immunity Act is mandatory and 
that failure to do so prohibits the bringing of an action 
against the governmental entity or its employee. 
In Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 (Ut. 1985), this court 
determined that the subject cause of action arose under a 
waiver of immunity under the Governmental Immunity Act and held 
the following regarding the statutory notice requirement: 
"As the claim made by the plaintiff must 
be considered under waiver from immunity 
statutes, her claim is brought under the 
provisions of the Governmental Immunity 
Act. As such. the notice of claim 
requirements contained in U.C.A., Section 
63-30-13 are mandated and her failure to 
comply with that provision bars her claim 
against Woodland Hills." Id. at 279. 
(Emphasis added). 
In accord is Roosendaal Construction & Mining Corp. v. 
Holman, 28 U.2d 396, 503 P.2d 446 (Ut. 1972), where this court 
affirmed the dismissal of a complaint against the State Tax 
Commission on the grounds that the complaint was fatally 
defective in that it failed to allege compliance with the 
notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
Section 63-30-11(2), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
provides: 
"Any person having a claim for injury 
against a governmental entity or against an 
employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority shall, before maintaining an 
action, file a written notice of claim with 
such entity." 
Section 63-30-13, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
also provides: 
"A claim against a political subdivision 
or against its employee for an act or omis-
sion occurring during the performance of his 
duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority, is barred unless 
notice of claim is filed with the governing 
body of a political subdivision within one 
year after the claim arises...." (Emphasis 
added). 
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As in Roosendaal, the complaint filed by Schultz also fails 
to allege compliance with the notice requirements of the 
Immunity Act and, therefore, the District Court properly 
dismissed her action. 
In Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Ut. 
1980), this court again upheld the notice requirement of the 
Immunity Act and held: 
"We think the Immunity Act is dispositive 
in that Section 63-30-13 provides: 
•A claim against a political 
subdivision is barred unless notice 
of claim is filed with the governing 
body of the political subdivision 
within one year after the cause of 
action arises1. (Emphasis the 
court•s). 
The record reflects that no such notice 
was filed with the County Commission of 
Uintah County any time during the year 
following appellant's discovery of her 
iniury, and hence the District Court was 
correct in dismissing the complaint as to 
Uintah County...with prejudice." (Emphasis 
added). Ld. at 354. 
Schultz, having neither pled nor actually filed a notice of 
claim with the governing body of the County as required by the 
Immunity Act, is barred in her attempt to bring an action 
against respondent Conger. 
B. THE CLAIM FILED BY SCHULTZ•S INSURANCE CARRIER FOR PERSONAL 
INJURY PROTECTION BENEFITS IS NOT A VALID NOTICE OF CLAIM 
UNDER THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
ACT. 
Schultz concedes that she did not file a notice of claim 
with Salt Lake County under either Section 63-30-11 or 14 of 
the Governmental Immunity Act (Brief, p. 5). Having admittedly 
failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Act, she 
nevertheless argues that the notice filed by her insurance 
company for Personal Injury Protection benefits under Section 
31-41-6, Utah Code Annotated was sufficient to meet the 
purposes of the Immunity Act. Her position is without merit. 
The form letter constituting the claim filed by State Farm 
does not meet the content requirements for notices as set forth 
in Section 63-30-11(3) of the Act in that it was not signed; 
not presented or signed by Schultz, her attorney, or her agent; 
did not specify any damage amount; did not set forth a 
statement of facts substantiating the claim; set forth only a 
possible claim for reimbursement for PIP benefits; and made no 
claim for loss of earnings, special damages, pain and 
suffering, nor for permanent, partial disability. (R-34). 
It is well established under Utah law that a prerequisite 
in pursuing a claim against a governmental entity is full 
compliance with the notice requirements of the Governmental 
Immunity Act. Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 
480 (Ut. 1975); Madsen v. Borthick. 658 P.2d 627 (Ut. 1983). 
In Scarborough, the plaintiff sued Granite School District 
to recover for injuries suffered by her son in a fall on a 
school playground. The trial court dismissed the complaint, 
finding that the action was barred due to plaintiff's failure 
to file a notice of claim as required by Section 63-30-13 of 
the Immunity Act. On appeal, plaintiff unsuccessfully argued 
that although there was no literal compliance with the statute 
in the usual form or sense, there was substantial compliance 
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and a sufficient "filing" of a claim to satisfy the 
requirements of the statute. In affirming the dismissal of 
plaintiff's action the Utah Supreme Court held: 
"The school district is a political 
subdivision of the state. Therefore it 
would normally be immune from suit; and the 
right to sue is an exception created by 
statute. We have consistently held that 
where a cause of action is based upon a 
statute, full compliance with its require-
ments is a condition precedent to the right 
to maintain a suit. In order to so meet the 
requirements of the statute quoted above and 
fulfill its intended purpose, the 'filing' 
of a claim should include these essentials: 
that it be in writing; that it contain a 
brief statement of the facts and the nature 
of the claim asserted; that it be subscribed 
by the party required to give it and who 
intends to rely on it; that it be directed 
to and delivered to someone authorized to or 
responsible for receiving it; and that this 
be done within the prescribed time." Id., at 
482. (Emphasis added). 
Clearly the notice submitted by Schultz's insurance carrier 
for PIP benefits was for an entirely separate and distinct 
claim from plaintiff's subsequent claim as contained in her 
complaint. 
The Utah No-Fault Act, Section 31-41-11 in effect at the 
time this action arose and under which the insurance carrier 
filed its notice, provides that (in this case) State Farm shall 
be reimbursed by Salt Lake County or if there is "an issue of 
liability for such reimbursement and the amount of same shall 
be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the 
insurers." 
This court has made it clear that State Farm does not even 
have a subrogation right to PIP funds claimed by its insured. 
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Ut. 1980). The 
insurance carrier fs only right to such funds is created by the 
above-referenced statute and must be sought from the tort-
feasor or the tort-feasor's insurance carrier. The only way to 
enforce the right of reimbursement is through arbitration. The 
claim presented by State Farm therefore could not be and is not 
a notice on behalf of the plaintiff for her claims over and 
above the no-fault PIP funds requested by the insurance carrier. 
The insurance carrier cannot be plaintiff's agent inasmuch 
as the insurance carrier has no authority to represent Schultz 
in the collection of her personal claim for damages over and 
above the PIP benefits. Her insurance carrier has no legal 
interest or obligation under its insurance contract to do so. 
C. SCHULTZ'S FAILURE TO DISCOVER CONGER'S STATUS AS A DEPUTY 
COUNTY SHERIFF DOES NOT TOLL THE MANDATORY NOTICE REQUIRE-
MENT OF THE IMMUNITY ACT. 
Plaintiff's accident was investigated by both Sandy City 
and another Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff. Both accident 
reports clearly indicate that the vehicle driven by Conger was 
owned by and registered to Salt Lake County. (R-43 through 
46). Schultz's argument that she was unaware that Conger was 
acting in the course and scope of his employment because he was 
not in uniform and the county vehicle was unmarked is simply 
unpersuasive. 
Schultz had one year in which to investigate and discover 
the facts needed to file a claim with the county. It took 
Schultz's insurance carrier only six weeks to review the 
-13-
accident and file a notice with the Salt Lake County Commission 
for personal injury protection under the Utah no-fault law then 
in effect. (R-34). When Schultz did file her action over 
nineteen months later, she did aver in paragraph 3 of her 
complaint: 
"Weldon Conger, struck her vehicle from 
the rear while operating a vehicle for Salt 
Lake County." (Emphasis added). R-2. 
It is obvious that the information necessary for Schultz to 
ascertain that Salt Lake County and a Deputy Salt Lake County 
Sheriff were involved in this accident were readily available 
based upon Schultz1s insurance company's prompt action and her 
own averments in her complaint. She simply failed to timely 
pursue her cause of action and failed to comply with the 
necessary filing requirements. 
This court rejected a similar argument in another case 
involving the notice requirements of the Immunity Act. The 
court held: 
"Southworth cannot now validly contend 
that he did not know, or should have known, 
of State's alleged negligence withrespect 
to his affirmative claim against State when 
he was present at and involved in this 
accident. He could at the time of the 
accident, or within one year thereafter, 
have determined the absence of warning 
signs on the highway, which is the 
predicate of his claim on appeal. Sears v. 
Southworth, 563 P.2d 192, 194 (Ut. 1977). 
(Emphasis added). 
Schultz, in this case, also could, at the time of the 
accident or within one year thereafter, have determined both 
the ownership of the vehicle by Salt Lake County, and the 
status of Conger as a Deputy Sheriff and complied with the 
notice requirements of the Immunity Act. 
In Varoz v. Salt Lake County. 506 P.2d 435 (Ut. 1973), this 
court upheld the requirement of notice even where the claimant 
had been misinformed about the ownership of the road in 
question and had mistakenly filed a notice of claim with the 
state rather than the county. The court held that his notice 
to the county which was filed late was fatal to his case and 
upheld the dismissal of his action by the trial court. 
The record is void of any reason other than plaintiff's own 
lack of knowledge and her own failure to take any action which 
would reveal the necessity of complying with the notice 
requirement. Such dilatory action and failure to proceed on 
the part of plaintiff is not sufficient grounds to toll the 
statute or void the compliance of the notice of claim 
requirements of the statute. 
Plaintiff attempts to call into question whether Deputy 
Conger was actually engaged in the scope and course of his 
employment at the time of the accident. This point is raised 
for the first time on appeal and is not properly before the 
court. Yates, supra, at 354. 
The record is absolutely uncontroverted by Schultz that 
Conger at the time of the accident was: 
(a) employed as a Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff; 
(b) on duty performing the statutory duty of serving 
process and notice during the course and scope of his 
employment; and (R-2, 9, 13). 
(c) driving a vehicle owned by and registered to Salt Lake 
County. (R-2, 9, 13, 43, 45). 
The court is bound by the record on appeal on this issue 
and should not be misled by the mere speculations of plaintiff 
regarding the documented and unrefuted status of deputy 
Conger's on-duty activities. 
POINT IV 
THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT IS CONSTITU-
TIONAL IN ALL REGARDS. 
This court has previously upheld the constitutionality of 
the Governmental Immunity Act in Madsen v, Borthick, supra, by 
adopting the reasoning of the Kansas Supreme Couct in the case 
of Brown v. Wichita State University:, 547 P.2d 105 (Kan. 
1976). In Brown the Kansas Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of its state's Governmental Immunity Act 
against challenges that it violated the egual protection 
guarantees of the constitution and also violated rights of due 
process. 
This court in Borthick held: 
"Sovereign immunity--the principle that 
the state cannot be sued in its own courts 
without its consent—was a well settled 
principle of American common law at the time 
Utah became a state. (Citations omitted). 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution, which prescribes that all 
courts shall be open and persons shall not be 
barred from using them to address injuries, 
was not meant to create a new remedy or a new 
right of action. (Citations omitted). 
Conseguently, Article I, Section 11 makes no 
change in the principle of sovereign 
immunity, and sovereign immunity is not 
unconstitutional under that section. It was 
so held in Brown v. Wichita State University 
(citations omitted), which involved a similar 
provision of the Kansas Constitution. We 
concur in the reasoning and result of that 
decision." Id. at 629. 
This court has specifically upheld the constitutionality of 
the Governmental Immunity Act on the grounds of equal 
protection of the laws whereas in this case, the notice 
requirement had been challenged. Sears v. Southworth, 563 P. 2d 
192 (Ut. 1977). In Southworth, as in the present case, the 
plaintiff there argued that the notice of claim requirements of 
the Immunity Act violated the equal protection provisions of 
both the federal and state constitution. This court found a 
rational basis for the notice requirement and upheld the 
constitutionality of the statute. 
Schultz contends that Buttrey v. Guaranteed Securities Co., 
78 U. 39, 300 P. 1040 (Ut. 1931) validates her claim that the 
Immunity Act violates her rights to due process. As already 
discussed, in Borthick, the court has previously held that the 
enactment of the Governmental Immunity Act does not violate the 
constitutional provision that all courts are to be open and 
persons not barred from using them to address injuries. 
In Buttrey, there had been a statutory change in the law 
which had precluded her right of action by the the time her 
case got to trial. However, in the present case there has been 
no change in the law which would preclude Schultz from 
maintaining her cause of action. The only harm suffered by 
Schultz is her failure to timely discover the facts surrounding 
her injuries and timely file her notice as required by the 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
This statute has been before the court numerous times since 
the constitutionality of the statute was upheld in Sears nearly 
ten years ago. The statute has been applied, interpreted and 
its constitutionality again upheld. The court's analysis of 
another constituional challenge to a state statute is most 
helpful: 
"There are certain principles of law 
relating to the validity of statutes which 
have a bearing on the problem of constitu-
tionality here presented. The first and 
foundational one is that the prerogative of 
the legislature as the creators of the law 
is to be respected. Consequently, its 
enactments are accorded a presumption of 
validity; and the courts do not strike down 
a legislative act unless the interests of 
justice in the particular case before it 
require doing so because the act is clearly 
in conflict with the higher law as set 
forth in the Constitution. 
It is noteworthy that the statute under 
consideration has previously been involved 
in cases before this Court under differing 
circumstances and has not been declared 
unconstitutional. With respect thereto, we 
see no persuasive reason to disagree with 
[the] propositions supportive of the 
validity of the statute...." Zamora v. 
Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 80 (Ut. 1981). 
The issues raised by Schultz regarding the constitution-
ality of the statute have previously been raised, heard, and 
decided in favor of the Act; the Governmental Immunity Act is 
constitutional in all regards. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent-Conger respectfully submits that this court's 
previous decisions upholding the constitutionality of the 
Governmental Immunity Act are controlling in this case. 
Further, compliance with the notice requirements of the Act are 
mandatory in this case because Conger was engaged in the 
governmental function of service of process and notice in the 
scope and course of his employment as a deputy county sheriff 
at the time plaintiff's cause of action arose. 
Plaintiff-Schultz's failure to file a notice of claim under 
the provisions of the Act preclude the bringing of her action 
and the order of the District Court dismissing her cause for 
failure to file such notice should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted this day of December, 1986. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Acting Salt Lake County Attorney 
By 
PAUL G. MAUGHAN 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys Respondent 
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I hereby certify that four copies of the Respondent's Brief 
were served upon John Spencer Snow, Attorney for Appellant, at 
261 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, this day of 
December, 1986. 
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operation of motor vehicles - Exception. 
63-30-3. Waiver of immunity for injury ciused by 
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, 
bridges, or other structures. 
63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous 
or defective public building, structure, or other public 
improvement - Exception. 
63-30-10. Waiver of immumtv for injury caused by 
negligent act or omission of employee • Exceptions -
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth 
amendment rights. 
63-30-11. Claim for injury - Notice • Cor en is -
Service - Legal disability. 
63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee - Time for 
filing notice. 
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its 
employee - Time for filing notice. 
63-30-14. Claim for injury - Approval or denial by 
governmental entity or insurance carrier within ninety 
days. 
63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury - Authority and 
time for filing action against governmental entity 
63-30-16. Jurisdiction of district courts over actions -
Application of Rules of Civil Procedure 
63-30-17. Venue of actions. 
63-30-18. Compromise and settlement of actions. 
63-30-19. Undertaking required of plaintiff in action. 
63-30-20. Judgment against governmental entity ban 
action against employee. 
63-30-21. Repealed. 
63-30-22. Exemplary or punitive damages prohibited • 
Governmental entity exempt from execution, attachment 
or garnishment. 
63-30-23. Payment of claim or judgment against state -
Presentment for payment. 
63-30-24. Payment of daira or judgment against political 
subdivision - Procedure by governing body 
63-30-25. Payment of claim or judgment against political 
subdivision - Installment payments. 
63-30-26. Reserve funds for payment of claims or 
purchase of insurance created by political subdivisions. 
63-30-27. Tax levy by political subdivisions for payment 
of daims, judgments, or insurance premiums 
63-30-2*. Liability insurance - Purchase or 
self-insurance by governmental entity authorized • 
Establishment of trust accounts for self-insurance. 
63-30-29. Repealed. 
63-30-29 5. Liability insurance • Government vehicles 
operated by employees outside scope of employment. 
63-30-30. Repealed. 
63-30-31. Liability insurance • Construction of polio 
not in compliance with act. 
63-30-32. Liability insurance - Methods for purchase or 
63-30-33. Liability insurance - Insurance for employees 
authorized - No right to indemnification or contribution 
from governmental agency. 
63-30-34. Limitation of judgments against governmental 
entity or employee - Insurance coverage exception. 
63-30-35. Comprehensive liability plan • Providing 
coverage • Expenses of attorney general in representing 
slate or employees. 
63-30-36. Defending government employee • Request -
Cooperation - Payment of judgment. 
63-30-37. Recovery of judgment paid and defense costs 
by government employee. 
63-30-38. Indemnification of governmental entity by 
employee not required. 
63-30-1. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the 
"Utah Governmental Immunity Act." 1965 
63-30-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter 
(1) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes 
any office, department, agency, authority, commi-
ssion, board, institution, hospital, college, university 
or other instrumentality of the state; 
(2) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, 
town, school district, public transit district, redeve-
lopment agency, special improvement or taxing 
district, or other governmental subdivision or public 
corporation, 
(3) "Governmental entity' means the state and us 
political subdivisions as defined herein, 
(4) 'Employee" means any officer, employee, or 
servant of a governmental entity, whether or not 
compensated, including student teachers certificated 
in accordance with section 53-2-15, educational 
aides, students engaged in providing services to 
members of the public in the course of an approved 
medical, nursing, or other professional health care 
clinical training program, volunteers and tutors, 
(5) "Claim means any claim or cause of action 
for money or damages against a governmental entity 
or against an employee, 
(6) "Injury' means death, injury to a person, 
damage to or loss oi propertv, or any other injury 
that a person may suffer to his person, or estate, 
that would be actionable if inflicted by a private 
person or his agent, 
(7) 'Personal injury' means an injury of any kind 
other than property damage, 
(8) 'Property damage means injury to, or loss 
of, any right, title, estate, or interest in real or per-
sonal property ins 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from 
suit. 
Except as mav be otherwise provided in this 
chapter, ail governmental entities are immune from 
suit tor anv injury which results from the exercise of 
a governmental function, governmentailv-owned 
hospital, nursing home, or other governmental 
health care facility, and from an approved medical, 
nursing, or other professional health care clinical 
training program conducted in either public or 
private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other 
natural disasters and the construction, repair, and 
operation of flood and storm systems by governm-
ental entities are considered to be governmental 
functions, and governmental entities and their otfl-
eers and employees are immune from suit for any 
injury or damage resulting from those activities ms 
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as 
admission or denial of liability - Effect of waiver 
of immunity - Exclusive remedy - Joinder of 
employee - Limitations on personal liability. 
(1) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless spe-
cifically provided, shall be construed as an admis-
sion or denial of liability or responsibility in so tar 
as governmental entities or their employees are 
concerned. If immunity from suit is waived by this 
chapter, consent to be sued is granted and liability 
of the entity shall be determined as if the entity were 
a private person. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as 
adversely affecting any immunity from suit which a 
governmental entity or employee may otherwise 
assert under state or federal law 
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity or 
its employee for an injury caused by an act or 
omission which occurs during the performance of 
such employee's duties, within the scope of emplo-
yment, or under color of authority is, after the etf-
ective date of this act, exclusive of any other civil 
action or proceeding by reason of the same subject 
matter against the employee or the estate of the 
employee whose act or omission gave nse to the 
claim, unless the employee acted or failed to act 
through fraud or malice. 
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(4) An employee may be joined in an action 
against a governmenta l enti ty in a representat ive 
capacity if the act or omission compla ined of is one 
for which the governmenta l entity may be liable, but 
n o employee may be held personally liable for acts 
0 r omissions occurring dur ing the per formance of 
the employee 's dut ies , within the scope of employ-
ment or under color of au thor i ty , unless it is es tab-
lished that the employee acted o r failed to act due to 
fraud or malice. 19«3 
63-30-5. Waiver of immuni ty as t o cont rac tua l 
obligat ions. 
Immuni ty from suit of all governmenta l entities is 
waived as to any contrac tual obl igat ion. Act ions 
arising out of contrac tual rights or obl igat ions shall 
not be subject to the requirements of Sections 63-
3 0 - 1 1 , 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 2 . 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 3 , 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 4 , 6 3 -
30-15, or 63-30-19. 19*5 
63-30-6. Waiver of immuni ty as to act ions 
involving proper ty . 
Immunity from suit of all governmenta l entities is 
waived for the recovery of any proper ty real or 
personal or for the possession thereof or to quiet 
title there to , o r to foreclose mortgages or other liens 
thereon or to determine any adverse claim thereon, 
or secure any adjudicat ion touching any mor tgage 
or other lien said entity may have or claim on the 
property involved. 1965 
63-30-7. Waiver of immuni ty for injury from 
negligent opera t ion of m o t o r vehicles -
Exception. 
Immuni ty from suit of all governmenta l entities is 
waived for injury resulting from the negligent ope-
ration by any- employee of a m o t o r vehicle or other 
equipment dur ing the per fo rmance of his dut ies , 
within the scope of employment , o r under color of 
authority; provided, however , that this section shall 
not apply to the opera t ion of emergency vehicles as 
defined by law and while being driven in accordance 
with the requirements of section 41-6-14. 19*3 
63-30-8. Waiver of immuni ty for injury caused 
by defective, unsafe , o r dange rous condi t ion of 
highways, br idges, o r o ther s t ruc tures . 
Immuni ty from suit of all governmenta l entities is 
waived for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe , 
or dangerous condi t ion of any highway, road , 
street, alley, crosswalk, s idewalk, culvert , tunnel , 
bridge, viaduct or o ther s t ructure located the reon . 
1965 
63-30-9. Waiver of immuni ty for injury from 
dangerous or defective public bui lding, s t ruc ture , 
or o ther public improvement - Except ion . 
Immuni ty from suit of all governmenta l entities is 
waived for any injury caused from a dangerous o r 
defective condi t ion of any public bui lding, s t ruc ture , 
dam, reservoir or other public improvement . I m m -
unity is not waived for latent defective condi t ions . 
1965 
63-30-10. Waiver of immuni ty for injury caused 
by negligent act or omission of employee -
Exceptions - Waiver for injury caused by 
violation of fourth a m e n d m e n t rights. 
(1) Immuni ty from suit of all governmenta l enti-
ties is waived for injury proximate ly caused by a 
negligent act or omission o f an employee commit ted 
within the scope of employment except if the injury: 
(a) arises ou t of the exercise o r pe r fo rmance or 
*he failure to exercise or per form a discret ionary 
function, whether or not the discretion is abused ; or 
(b) arises out of assaul t , ba t te ry , false impris-
onment, false arrest , malicious prosecut ion , intent-
tonal t respass, abuse of process , libel, s lander, 
deceit, interference with cont rac t rights, infliction of 
*<*o, ut«h For ANNOTATIONS, consult 1 
mental anguish, or civil r ights; o r 
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspen-
sion, or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to 
issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, 
certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; 
or 
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspec-
t ion, or by reason of making an inadequate or 
negligent inspection of any proper ty ; or 
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution 
of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if 
malicious or without probable cause; or 
( 0 arises out of a misrepresentation by the 
employee whether or not it is negligent or intenti-
onal; or 
(g) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful 
assemblies, public demonstrat ions, mob violence, 
and civil disturbances; or 
(h) arises out of or in connection with the col-
lection of and assessment of taxes; or 
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah Nati-
onal Guard; or 
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person 
in any state prison, county, or city jail or other 
place of legal confinement; or 
(k) arises from any natural condition on state 
lands or the result of any activity authorized by the 
State Land Board; or 
(1) arises out of the activities of providing 
emergency medical assistance, fighting fire, handling 
hazardous materials, or emergency evacuations. 
(2) Immunity from suit of all governmental enti-
ties is waived for injury proximately caused or 
arising out of a violation of protected fourth ame-
ndment rights as provided in Chapter 16, Title 78 
which shall be the exclusive remedy for injunes to 
those protected rights. If Section 78-16-5 or 
Subsection 77-35-12(g) or any parts thereof are 
held invalid or unconsti tutional, this Subsection (2) 
shall be void and governmental entities shall remain 
immune from suit for violations of fourth amend-
ment rights. 1915 
63-30-11. O a i m for injury - Notice • Contents 
• Service - Legal disability. 
(1) A claim is deemed to arise when the statute of 
limitations that would apply if the claim were 
against a private person commences to run . 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a 
governmental entity or against an employee for a n 
act or omission occurr ing dur ing the performance of 
his duties, within the scope of employment , o r 
under color of author i ty shall , before maintaining 
an act ion, file a writ ten notice of claim with such 
enti ty. 
(3) The notice of claim shall set forth a brief sta-
tement of the facts, the na tu re of the claim asserted, 
and the damages incurred by the claimant so far as 
they are known , shall be signed by the person 
making the claim or such person ' s agent , a t torney, 
parent or legal guard ian , a n d shall be directed a n d 
delivered to the responsible governmental entity in 
the manner and within the t ime prescribed in section 
63-30-12 or 63-30-13, as appl icable . 
(4) If, at the t ime the claim arises, the claimant is 
under the age of major i ty , o r mentally incompetent 
and without a legal guard ian , or imprisoned, upon 
application by the cla imant and after hearing and 
notice to the governmenta l entity the cour t , in its 
discretion, may extend the t ime for service of notice 
of claim; bu t in no event shall it grant an extension 
which exceeds the applicable s ta tute of limitations. 
In determining whether to grant an extension, the 
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court shall consider whether the delay in serving the 
notice o f claim will substantially prejudice the gov-
ernmental entity in maintaining its defense on the 
merits. 19§3 
63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee -
Time for filing notice. 
A claim against the state or its employee for an 
act or omission occurring during the performance of 
his duties, within the scope of employment , or 
under color o f authority, is barred unless notice o f 
claim is filed with the attorney general and the 
agency concerned within one year after the claim 
arises, or before the expiration of any extension of 
time granted under subsection 63-30-11 (4). 19*3 
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or 
its employee - Time for filing notice. 
A claim against a political subdivision or against 
its employee for an act or omission occurring during 
the performance o f his duties, within the scope of 
employment , or under color of authority, is barred 
unless notice of claim is filed with the governing 
body of the political subdivision within one year 
after the claim arises, or before the expiration of 
any extension o f time granted under subsection 63-
30-11(4). 19«3 
63-30-14. Claim for injury - Approval or denial 
by governmental entity or insurance carrier within 
ninety days. 
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the 
governmental entity or its insurance carrier shall act 
thereon and notify the claimant in writing o f its 
approval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to have 
been denied if at the end of the ninety-day period 
the governmental entity or its insurance earner has 
failed to approve or deny the claim. 1965 
63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury - Authority 
and time for filing action against governmental 
entity. 
If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an 
action in the district court against the governmental 
entity or an employee o f the entity. The action must 
be commenced within one year after denial or the 
denial period as specified in this chapter. ins 
63-30-16. Jurisdiction of district courts over 
actions - Application of Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The district courts shall have exclusive original 
jurisdiction over any action brought under this 
chapter, and such actions shall be governed by the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in so far as they are 
consistent with this chapter. i9*j 
63-30-17. Venue of actions. 
Actions against the state may be brought in the 
county in which the claim arose or in Salt Lake 
County. Actions against a county may be brought in 
the county in which the claim arose, or in the defe-
ndant county, or, upon leave granted by a district 
court judge of the defendant county, in any county 
contiguous to the defendant county. Leave may be 
granted ex parte. Actions against all other political 
subdivisions including cities and towns, shall be 
brought in the county in which the political subdi-
vision is located or in the county in which the claim 
arose. 19*3 
63-30-18. Compromise and settlement of actions. 
A political subdivision, after conferring with its 
legal officer or other legal counsel if it has no such 
officer, may compromise and settle any action as to 
the damages or other relief sought. 
The risk manager in the department o f administ-
rative services may compromise and settle any claim 
for damages filed against the state up to and inclu-
ding 510,000 for which the risk management fund 
may be liable, and may, with the concurrence of the 
attorney general or his representative and the exec-
utive director o f the department of administrative 
services, compromise and settle a claim for damages 
in excess of $10,000 for which the risk management 
fund may be liable. i9§3 
63-30-19. Undertaking required of plaintiff in 
action. 
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff shall 
file an undertaking in a sum fixed by the court, but 
in no case less than the sum of $300, conditioned 
upon payment by the plaintiff o f taxable costs inc-
urred by the governmental entity in the action if the 
plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or fails to 
recover judgment. 1965 
63-30-20. Judgment against governmental entity 
bars action against employee . 
Judgment against a governmental entity in an 
action brought under this act shall constitute a 
complete bar to any action by the claimant, by 
reason of the same subject matter, against the 
employee whose act or omiss ion gave rise to the 
claim. 1965 
63-30-21. Repealed. 197S 
63-30-22. Exemplary or punitive damages 
prohibited • Governmental entity exempt from 
execution, attachment or garnishment. 
N o judgment shall be rendered against the gove-
rnmental entity for exemplary or punitive damages; 
nor shall execution, attachment or garnishment issue 
against the governmental entity. 1965 
63-30-23. Payment of claim or judgment against 
state - Presentment for payment. 
Any claim approved by the state as defined by 
subsection 63-30-2(5) or any final judgment obt-
ained against the state shall be presented to the state 
risk manager, or to the off ice, agency, institution or 
other instrumentality involved for payment, if 
payment by said instrumentality is otherwise perm-
itted by law. If such payment is not authorized by 
law then said judgment or claim shall be presented 
to the board of examiners and the board shall 
proceed as provided in section 63-6-10. 19*3 
63-30-24. Payment of claim or judgment against 
political subdivision - Procedure by governing 
body. 
Any claim approved by a political subdivision or 
any final judgment obtained against a political 
subdivision shall be submitted to the governing body 
thereof to be paid forthwith from the general funds 
of said political subdivision unless said funds are 
appropriated to s o m e other use or restricted by law 
or contract for other purposes. 1965 
63-30-25. Payment of claim or judgment against 
political subdivision - Installment payments. 
If the subdivision is unable to pay the claim or 
award during the current fiscal year it may pay the 
claim or award in not more than ten ensuing annual 
installments o f equal size or in such other installm-
ents as are agreeable to the claimant. 1965 
63-30-26. Reserve funds for payment of claims or 
purchase of insurance created by political 
subdivisions. 
Any political subdivision may create and maintain 
a reserve fund or may jointly with one or more 
other political subdivisions make contributions to a 
joint reserve fund, for the purpose of making 
payment of claims against the co-operating subdi-
visions when they become payable pursuant to this 
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chapter, or for the purpose of purchasing liability 
insurance to protect the co-operating subdivisions 
from any or all risks created by this chapter. 1983 
63-30-27. Tax levy by political subdivisions for 
payment of claims, judgments, or insurance 
premiums. 
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the 
contrary, ail political subdivisions shall have auth-
ority to levy an annual property tax sufficient to pay 
any claims, settlements, or judgments, or to pay the 
costs to defend against same, or for the purpose of 
establishing and maintaining a reserve fund for the 
payment of such claims, settlements, or judgments 
as may be reasonably anticipated; and there is 
hereby specifically included any judgment against an 
elected official or employee of any political subdiv-
ision, including peace officers based upon a claim 
for punitive damages, provided, that the authority 
of a political subdivision for the payment of such 
judgments for punitive damages is limited in any 
individual case to S 10,000. It is hereby declared to 
be the legislative intent that the payments authorized 
for punitive damage judgments is money spent for a 
public purpose within the meaning of this section 
and Article XIII, Sec. 5, Utah Constitution; or to 
pay the premium for such insurance as authorized, 
even though as a result of such levy the maximum 
levy as otherwise restricted by law is exceeded; 
provided, that in no event shall such levy exceed 
.0001 nor shall the revenues derived therefrom be 
used for any other purpose than those stipulated 
herein. ms 
63-30-28. Liability insurance - Purchase or 
self-insurance by governmental entity authorized 
- Establishment of trust accounts for 
self-insurance. 
Any governmental entity within the state may 
purchase commercial insurance, self-insure, or self-
insure and purchase excess commercial insurance in 
excess of the statutory limits of this chapter against 
any risk created or recognized by this chapter or any 
action for which a governmental entity or its empl-
oyee may be held liable. 
In addition to any other reasonable means of self-
insurance, a governmental entity may self-insure 
with respect to specified classes of claims by estab-
lishing a trust account under the management of an 
independent private trustee having authority with 
respect to claims of that character to expend both 
principal and earnings of the trust account solely to 
pay the costs of investigation, discovery, and other 
pretrial and litigation expenses including attorneys' 
fees, and to pay all sums for which the governme-
ntal entity may be adjudged liable or for which a 
compromise settlement may be agreed upon. The 
monies and interest earned on said trust fund shall 
be subject to investment pursuant to Chapter 7, 
Title 51, the State Money Management Act of 1974, 
and shall be subject to audit by the state auditor. 
Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the trust 
agreement between the governmental entity and the 
trustee may authorize the trustee to employ counsel 
to defend actions against the entity and its emplo-
yees and to protect and safeguard the assets of the 
trust, to provide for claims investigation and adju-
stment services, to employ expert witnesses and 
consultants, and to provide such other services and 
functions necessary and proper to carry out the 
Purposes of the trust. 19S5 
63-30-29. Repealed. 19*3 
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63-30-29.5. Liability insurance - Government 
vehicles operated by employees outside scope of 
employment. 
A governmental entity that owns vehicles driven 
by employees of the governmental entity with the 
express or implied consent of the entity, but which, 
at the time liability is incurred as a result of an 
automobile accident, is not being driven and used 
within the course and scope of the driver's emplo-
yment is considered to provide the driver with the 
insurance coverage required by Chapter 12A, Title 
41 . However, the liability coverages considered 
provided are the minimum limits under Section 31A-
22-304. IMS 
63-30-30. Repealed. W7t 
63-30-31. Liability insurance - Construction of 
policy not in compliance with act. 
Any insurance policy, rider or endorsement here-
after issued and purchased to insure against any risk 
which may arise as a result of the application of this 
chapter, which contains any condition or provision 
not in compliance with the requirements of the 
chapter, shall not be rendered invalid thereby, but 
shall be construed and applied in accordance with 
such conditions and provisions as would have 
applied had such policy, rider or endorsement been 
in full compliance with this chapter, provided the 
policy is otherwise valid. i9fj 
63-30-32. Liability insurance - Methods for 
purchase or renewal. 
N o contract or policy of insurance may be purc-
hased or renewed under this chapter except upon 
public bid to be let to the lowest and best bidder; 
except that the purchase or renewal of insurance by 
the state shall be conducted in accordance with the 
provisions of sections 63-56-1 through 63-56-
73. 19*3 
63-30-33. Liability insurance • Insurance for 
employees authorized - No right to 
indemnification or contribution from 
governmental agency. 
A governmental entity may insure any or all of its 
employees against liability, in whole or in pan , for 
injury or damage resulting from an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of an employee's 
duties, within the scope of employment, or under 
color of authority, regardless of whether or not said 
entity is immune from suit for said act or omission, 
and any expenditure for such insurance is for a 
public purpose. The insurer under any contract or 
policy of insurance pursuant to this section shall 
have no right to indemnification or contribution 
from the governmental entity or its employee with 
respect to any loss or liability covered by the cont-
ract or policy. 19*3 
63-30-34. Limitation of judgments against 
governmental entity or employee - Insurance 
coverage exception. 
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3), if a 
judgment for personal injury against a governmental 
entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity 
has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $250,000 for one 
person in any one occurrence, or $500,000 for two 
or more persons in any one occurrence, the court 
shall reduce the judgment to that amount. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3), if a 
judgment for property damage against a governm-
ental entity, or an employee whom a governmental 
entity has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $100,000 in 
any one occurrence, the court shall reduce the jud-
gment to that amount. 
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(3) If a governmental entity has secured insurance 
coverage in excess of the amounts set forth in sub-
sections (1) and (2), the court shall reduce the 
amount of the judgment or award to a sum equal to 
the applicable limits of the insurance coverage. 1983 
63-30-35. Comprehensive liability plan -
Providing coverage - Expenses of attorney 
general in representing state or employees. 
(1) After consultation with appropriate state age-
ncies, the risk manager in the department of admi-
nistrative services shall provide a comprehensive 
liability plan, with limits not lower than those set 
forth in section 63-30-34, which will protect the 
state and its indemnified employees from claims and 
liability. Deductibles and maximum limits of cove-
rage shall be determined by the risk manager in 
consultation with the director of administrative 
services. 
(2) The risk manager may expend funds from the 
risk management fund established in section 63-1-
47, to procure and provide coverage to all state 
agencies and their indemnified employees, except 
those specifically exempted by law, and shall appo-
rtion the cost of such coverage in accordance with 
section 63-1-47. Unless specifically authorized by 
statute to do so, including subsection 63-1-47(9), 
no agency other than the risk manager may procure 
or provide liability insurance for the state. 
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 67-
5-3 or any other provision of this code, the state 
attorney general may bill the department of admin-
istrative services for all costs and legal fees expended 
by the attorney general, including attorneys' and 
secretarial salaries, in representing the state or any 
indemnified employee against any claim for which 
the risk management fund may be liable and in 
advising state agencies and employees regarding such 
claims. The risk manager shall draw funds from the 
risk management fund for this purpose. i w 
63-30-36. Defending government employee -
Request - Cooperation - Payment of judgment. 
(1) Before a governmental entity may defend its 
employee against a claim, the employee must make 
a written request to the governmental entity to 
defend him and must make it within ten days after 
service of process upon him or within such longer 
period as would not prejudice the governmental 
entity in maintaining a defense on his behalf, or 
conflict with notice requirements imposed on the 
entity in connection with insurance carried by the 
entity relating to the risk involved. If the employee 
fails to make a request or fails to reasonably coop-
erate in the defense, the governmental entity is not 
required to defend or continue to defend the empl-
oyee, nor pay any judgment, compromise, or settl-
ement against the employee in respect to the claim. 
(2) If a governmental entity conducts the defense 
of an employee, the governmental entity shall pay 
any judgment based upon or any compromise or 
settlement of the claim except as provided in subs-
ection (3). 
(3) A governmental entity may conduct the 
defense of an employee under an agreement with the 
employee that the government entity reserves the 
right not to pay the judgment, compromise, or set-
tlement unless it is established that the claim arose 
out of an act or omission occurring during the per-
formance of his duties, within the scope of his 
employment, or under color of authority. 19«3 
63-30-37. Recovery of judgment paid and defense 
costs by government employee. 
(1) Subject to subsection (2), if an employee pays 
a judgment entered against him, or any portion of 
it, which the governmental entity is required to pay 
under section 63-30-36, the employee is entitled 
to recover the amount of such payment and the 
reasonable costs incurred in his defense from the 
governmental entity. 
(2) If a governmental entity does not conduct the 
defense of an employee against a claim, or does 
conduct the defense under an agreement as provided 
in subsection 63-30-36(3), the employee may 
recover from the governmental entity under subse-
ction (1) if: 
(a) The employee establishes that the act or 
omission upon which the judgment is based occu-
rred during the performance of his duties, within the 
scope of his employment, or under color of autho-
rity, and that he conducted the defense in good 
faith; and 
(b) The governmental entity does not establish 
that the injury or damage resulted from the fraud or 
malice of the employee. 19« 
63-30-38. Indemnification of governmental entity 
by employee not required. 
If a governmental entity pays all or part of a 
judgment based on or a compromise or settlement 
of a claim against the governmental entity or an 
employee, the employee may not be required to 
indemnify the governmental entity for the payment. 
I9S3 
Chapter 30a. Reimbursement of Legal 
Fees and Costs to Officers and Employees 
63-30a-l. Definitions. 
63-30a-2. Indictment or information against officer or 
employee - Reimbursement of attorneys' fees and court 
costs incurred in defense. 
63-30i-3. Request for defense or reimbursement. 
63-30a-l . Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Officer or employee* means any individual 
who at the time of an event giving rise to a claim 
under this act is or was elected or appointed to or 
employed by a public entity, whether or not comp-
ensated, but does not include an independent cont-
ractor. 
(2) "Public entity" means the state or any political 
subdivision of it or any office, department, division, 
board, agency, commission, council, authority, 
institution, hospital, school, college, university, or 
other instrumentality of the state or any such polit-
ical subdivision. 1977 
63-30a-2. Indictment or information against 
officer or employee - Reimbursement of 
attorneys' fees and court costs incurred in 
defense. 
If a state grand jury indicts or if an information 
is filed against an officer or employee, in connection 
with or arising out of any act or omission of that 
officer or employee during the performance of his 
duties, within the scope of his employment or under 
color of his authority, and that indictment or info-
rmation is quashed or dismissed or results in a jud-
gment o f acquittal, unless the indictment or infor-
mation is quashed or dismissed upon application or 
motion of the prosecuting attorney, that officer or 
employee shall be entitled to recover from the public 
entity reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs 
necessarily incurred in the defense of that indictment 
or information. I9f3 
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^^SIOIOJCILU^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. C-85-7163 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss having come on regularly 
for hearing on the 24th day of February, 1986, before the 
undersigned, and L. E. Midgley, Esq., appearing in behalf of 
defendants and John Spencer Snow, Esq., appearing in behalf of 
the plaintiff, and arguments of counsel having been heard and 
the memoranda submitted by the parties having heretofor been 
reviewed by the Court, and the Court having found that the 
defendant Conger at the time of the accident in question which 
occurred on March 9, 1984, was employed as a deputy sheriff 
without uniform for the Salt Lake County Sherifffs Office and 
was driving an unmarked vehicle registered to Salt Lake County ; 
that the plaintiff failed to file a Notice of Claim as 
provided under the provisions of 63-30-11 (2) (3) U.C.A. 
within the time prescribed by said statute; that the notice 
filed by the plaintiff's insurance company was insufficient; 
and that the Complaint filed herein was filed after the 
statute of limitations had expired under the provisions of 
the Governmental Immunity Act; and the Court having found that 
the defendants1 Motion to Dismiss should be granted. 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed 
that plaintiff's Complaint be and the same is herewith 
dismissed with prejudice,., 
DATED this / / J day of f7^'&>*t&^ 1986. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Attorney ^for Plaintiffs 
BY THE COURT: 
LEONARD H. RUSSON,-District jQdge 
ATTEST 
H. DIXCN HiNDLEY 
By 
' Deputy Ofer* 
